Review of The New Wittgenstein-- Crary & Read Eds 403p (2000)(review revised 2019) by Starks, Michael
1 
 
Review of The New Wittgenstein-- Crary & Read Eds 
403p (2000)(review revised 2019) 
      
Michael Stark 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein is the most famous philosopher of modern times but very few 
understand his pioneering work and there has been a collective amnesia regarding 
him in recent decades. Most of the essays are new but some date as far back as 1979 
and whether they give a new view of his ideas depends on one’s understanding of 
what he said. For me, the interpretations are not new and mostly just as confused 
as nearly all the other commentary on W and on human behavior throughout the 
behavioral sciences and by the general public. As usual, nobody seems to grasp that 
philosophy is armchair psychology, and that W was (in my view) the greatest 
natural psychologist of all time.  He laid out the general structure of how the mind 
works, which is often referred to as intentionality and is roughly equivalent to 
cognition or personality or thinking and willing or higher order thought (HOT). He 
can thus be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary psychology, although hardly 
anyone but me seems to realize it. W was thus nearly 50 years ahead of his time as 
the first to reject (though not entirely consistently) the blank slate or cultural view 
of human nature, though this has gone unrecognized and he has generally been 
interpreted as supporting a communal consensus view of psychology—exactly the 
opposite of his overall thrust (e.g., see Short’s comment on p 115). 
 
I provide a table of intentionality for a current frame of reference from the two 
systems point of view before remarking on each of the essays. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
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As always in philosophical writing, it is quite striking that nobody (in my view) 
fully grasps what W was doing and no one to this day has succeeded (and few even 
try) to follow his method, with its constant recourse to perspicuous examples of our 
psychological functioning. 
 
His wholly novel ideas and unique super-Socratic trialogues and telegraphic 
writing, coupled with his often solitary, almost solipsistic lifestyle, and premature 
death in 1951, resulted in a failure to publish anything of his later thought during 
his lifetime and only slowly has his huge nachlass of some 20,000 pages been 
published- a project which continues to this day. The only complete edition of the 
largely German nachlass was first issued by Oxford in 2000 with Intelex now 
publishing it, as well as all the 14 Blackwell English language books on a searchable 
CD. The Blackwell CD costs ca. $100 but the Oxford CD is over $1000 or over $2000 
for the set including the images of the original manuscripts. They can however be 
obtained via interlibrary loan and also, like most books and articles are now freely 
available on the net (libgen.io, b-ok.org and on p2p).  The searchable CDROM of 
his English books as well as that of the entire German nachlass, is now on several 
sites on the net and the Bergen CD is due for a new edition ca 2021-- 
http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf).  
 
 One reason I mention this is that, though most of his best work has now been 
translated and published in English, it is useful and often indispensable to consider 
his German remarks in the nachlass and few scholars are up to it. Editing and 
translating of his work by his executors has also been less than perfect and capturing 
the precise meaning of the original German is a huge problem as several authors 
here note (e.g., the need in many passages to translate “darstellung” as an action and 
not as a disposition (propositional attitude)—one of many distinctions W was the 
first to elucidate.  One can get a graphic view of this by looking at Victor Rodych’s 
two revelatory articles (the first without and the latter with the benefit of the 
nachlass) on W and Godel in the journal Minds and Machines.  
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table 
of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over the last 
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few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much 
to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by 
current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes which are evidenced in 
the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 
3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing 
behavior that I find more complete and useful than any other framework I have 
seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three 
dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, 
between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W 
demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly 
different uses (meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by 
scientists but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as 
opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful 
in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness.  
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), 
the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality 
(LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical 
philosophical term. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place (H+N, 
T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions 
etc. 
**          Searle’s Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
I give detailed explanations of this table in my other writings. 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of 
language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at 
explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth.  It is critical 
to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use 
of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination of context variation 
is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous 
tables and charts that should be compared with this one.  
 
It is well known that W dramatically altered his views beginning in 1929 and by the 
mid 30’s essentially totally rejected his prior work, including the famous Tractatus. 
However, the Tractatus continues to fascinate and several of the current authors 
(Diamond, Conant) follow a long tradition in trying to explain just what he meant 
and how this changed or did not in his later work.  For me, the only value in this is 
to see how early in his life (ca 1914) he began to express the germs of his later 
understanding of human psychology.  On this issue, I think Hacker’s final essay 
here is definitive. His affirmative answer to “Was he trying to whistle it?” indicates 
that W of the Tractatus was trying to describe what he so famously insisted could 
not be said but only shown. Hacker (along with almost everyone else on the planet) 
does not seem to realize that this meant that W was trying to describe the 
functioning of the axioms of our innate evolutionary psychology by giving 
examples from our everyday use of language (i.e., from our thought), but he does a 
beautiful job of refuting Diamond and Conant’s views in their essays here, and 
many others elsewhere, and provides chapter and verse for this view.  See e.g., 
various comments on pg 360,363, 372, 373, 376-81 for W’s clear references to our 
innate and unquestionable (i.e. denying our axioms lacks sense) intentionality. 
Hacker puts an end (one hopes) to the view that W was actually writing 
Kierkegaardian nonsense. 
 
Crary’s introductory essay is tolerable, but makes a grotesque understatement on 
p3 when she states that there is “something essentially unsatisfactory” about the 
view that W supported the idea that there is “no such thing as fully objective 
agreement.”  In fact, such a view is utterly mistaken, as is amply demonstrable 
throughout his latter writings in which he shows that our normal behavior is the 
very definition of objective agreement and it’s denial is incoherent (see e.g., his last 
work “On Certainty”). See my writings and the work of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock.  
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Cavell was one of the first to begin to penetrate deeply into W and his typically 
brilliant essay (reprinted from 1979) almost gets to the core of the matter, but he 
tends to get rather more florid and poetic than I think useful, and just does not quite 
get that W was laying out the structure of our evolved EP.  Of course, he can be 
forgiven, as nobody else does either.  
 
McDowell’s essay from 1981 is quite dated and severely hampered by his rather 
opaque style, but has some good points, in spite of the expected oblivion to W’s 
defining the modern study of innate intentional psychology.  
 
I find Finkelstein’s article on W and Platonism to be excellent and agree that Kripke 
and Wright are wrong and McDowell and Tait are right about this. Though neither 
he nor anyone I have read sees it this way, it seems to me very useful to view Plato’s 
Ideals as our cognitive modules programmed by our genes.  No term will be perfect, 
but if we have to label W’s views, then I agree with Finkelstein and McDowell that 
“naturalistic Platonist” gets pretty close. Certainly, he dealt the death blow to the 
idea that an interpretation is required to follow a rule.  
 
Read’s comments on word meanings seems unexceptionable but the writing is 
horrific (i.e., more or less standard philosophy). See his other works for some truly 
brilliant writing.  
 
Stone on W on Deconstruction has its moments but for me Decon and Derrida are 
an utter waste of time and it is comical how he tends to lapse into the typical Decon 
word salad (I first typed “world salad”, which seems apt as well) when he discusses 
Derrida.  Again, we find Kripke’s bizarre skeptical interpretation of W discussed 
and rejected. In spite of occasional lapses, it is clear as crystal that W rejected the 
blank slate community consensus view in favor of his novel innate axiomatic 
description of our psychology. Meaning is normative because it’s innate, automatic 
and invisible and not subject to interpretation—a word W reserves for “the 
substitution of one expression of the rule for another.” (p100). Neither Kripke nor 
Derrida gets the point since (like nearly everyone) they are hopelessly ensnared in 
the blank slate defaults when trying to explain behavior.   
 
Crary’s essay on W and political thought is clever but standard blank slate again 
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and so hopeless. Politics, like all of culture, is a slight extension of our evolutionary 
psychology which demonstrates the ineluctable dominance of nature over nurture 
and W’s contribution was to point this out, though usually indirectly. 
 
Putnam’s “Rethinking Mathematical Necessity” shows that by 1994 he had begun to 
understand W, but even so it’s a big advance over his earlier work. 
 
Floyd on W and mathematical philosophy is pretty good stuff, but does not grasp 
the overall picture of W as an evolutionary psychologist and math as a slight 
extension of our intuitive psychology. There is no boundary between math and the 
rest of our intentionality and W interleaved math examples throughout his work.  
Many of his most incisive revelations on our psychological functions and the 
relation of language to the world he demonstrated with mathematics or geometry.  
Floyd gives a good discussion of W’s example of trisecting the angle which requires 
that we carefully examine the operation of disposition words like think, doubt, 
imagine, believe, know, decide and realize they depict actions or potential for 
actions and not mental states, as W first pointed out in the 1930’s. But in this case, 
as in all cases (ie, all of language and philosophy) this is only the beginning of what 
W shows us and we need to realize that “question”, “answer”, “mathematics”, 
“proof”, “equation”, etc., the various uses of which comprise complex language 
games (concepts or cognitive modules or groups of them) which often have little or 
NOTHING in common except that they are all included in our psychology (our 
form of life as he liked to say,) but this all operates invisibly and automatically in 
our subterranean psychology and thus is overlooked by virtually everyone 
including, incredibly, nearly all philosophers (even specialists on W), as this book 
also sadly illustrates.  To Floyd’s great credit, she gets it mostly right and the book 
is worth buying just for her article! Those intrigued by mathematical avenues into 
intentional psychology, as well as a general view of W might find a few things of 
interest in my comments on W, Floyd, Rodych, Berto and Godel and math in my 
other articles.  
 
Diamond wastes her article on W by spending most of it discussing such items of 
philosophical esoterica as what the Tractatus implied regarding Russell’s work, 
which is probably one of the least interesting ways to investigate human behavior. 
 
Cerbone likewise expends his energies mostly on the historical aspects of W’s 
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relation to Frege, though he does make some good points about the limits of sense 
along the way (e.g., that the language games W proposed often would require a 
substantial remodeling of our psyche to work).  Sadly and almost inevitably (i.e., 
oblivion to how our mind works is another of the hundreds of universals of our EP) 
he seems to evince no real grasp that it was his insights into our evolutionary 
psychology that gave such power to W’s work, that these innate axioms (or concepts 
or cognitive modules) provide our “conceptual skin”(p308), is not clear that T and 
F do not apply to logic and math in the same sense as to empirical facts and that 
they are extensions of limited parts of our psychology, and that if we have a 
reasonable test for “illogical” then this term definitely characterizes much of our 
behavior.  But a stimulating read nonetheless. 
 
Witherspoon’s article on W and Carnap (member of the Vienna circle and the only 
person W ever directly accused of plagiarism) leaves me cold, as he has no insight 
at all into the workings of the mind, although he uses (abuses) lots of the right 
words— “logical syntax”, “linguistic framework,” “grammar.”  Yes, he is certainly 
right that we often misunderstand W, but the really important point is that we 
ought to understand behavior. He justly gives attention to W’s last work “On 
Certainty” which some regard as his best and which I regard as the foundation 
stone of philosophy and psychology -see my review.   W was dying of prostate 
cancer at the time and was often barely able to work, but it is on the way to 
becoming (with TLP and PI) his most famous (e.g., see the two recent books by 
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock).  But, he wastes his time on vague theorizing about 
“quasi-understanding” rather than explicating the depths of our intentional 
psychology, so beautifully laid out by W. 
 
Those who wish to have a more conventional (but in my view typically confused-- 
in spite of some good points) review of this volume may consult Philosophical 
Investigations 24:2p185-92(2001).   
 
